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Abstract 
I analyse the optimal contracting behaviour of an employer who faces workers with di erent, incorrect 
beliefs about their productivity (naïve workers). Researchers in contract theory have analysed cases 
where the principal has full in-formation on agents’ true productivity, and cases where the principal 
has priors on productivity levels. I contribute to this discussion by introducing the novel assump-tion 
that workers’ naïveté depends on their actual productivity level. In particular, I focus on the use the 
employer makes of this information when designing contracts under asymmetric information. The 
results highlight a new trade-o  the employer faces between exploiting strongly naïve workers and 
designing e cient contracts for the most widespread type of worker, according to her posteriors. 
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21. Introduction
When facing a new task, individuals form expectations about their ability to carry
it out, and about the amount of eﬀort required to do so. Typically, they are assumed
to always hold unbiased beliefs about their abilities. Often, however, this is not the
case. From the workman estimating the time to build a wall to the athlete who
forms expectations about the amount of eﬀort needed to achieve a specific goal,
the final result is not always the one expected. In economics we often assume that
such ‘errors’ result from specific realisations of random variables either side of the
unbiased expectation. However, estimations can be distorted by one having wrong
perception of the situation, or by firm beliefs that turn out to be inconsistent with
reality. Economics deals with these kinds of situations with the concept of naïveté
(Strotz, 1956), that is, the inability of an individual to form unbiased expectations
about an unknown event. In other words, a systematic over- or underestimation of
the realisation of a random variable.
Extensive and highly influential work has been carried out on how naïveté aﬀects
contract design and agents’ welfare, in several diﬀerent frameworks (the most rel-
evant papers are Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006, 2008). In the literature, naïveté is often
assumed to be an independent feature of agents. Nevertheless, extensive exper-
imental evidence has shown that one’s inability to evaluate skills in a particular
domain is often correlated with a lack of the very same skills one is trying to esti-
mate.2 Hence, for example, the inability of a worker to estimate his own abilities
correctly may be a sign of his unsuitability for the job; a student’s misperception
of the amount of hours needed to study for a test may be correlated to her lack of
the skills required to pass the test; a consultant biased opinion on an issue may be
a signal of his poor expertise on the matter at hand.
Following these results, in this paper, I investigate situations where the level of
naïveté of an individual depends on his own innate ability. In particular, I study
workers who have systematically wrong (naïve) beliefs about their own produc-
tivity. Unlike the existing literature I make the novel assumption that workers’
naïveté depends on their ability (their type). On the other hand, the employer,
who is perfectly unbiased, designs contracts to hire the workers.3 Besides a sur-
plus extraction motive, when maximising profits the principal is interested in using
this information in order to design more eﬃcient contracts. Here, a new trade-oﬀ
2Important contributions are Svenson (1981); Dunning and Kruger (1999); Dittrich, Güth, and Mar-
ciejovsky (2005); Banner, Dunning, Ehrlinger, Kerri, and Kruger (2008); Moore and Healy (2008).
These are analysed in section 2.
3The assumption about the employer having unbiased belief can be thought of as her having more
experience, or better knowing the suitability of the worker population for the specific job she is
hiring for. Ultimately, dropping this assumption simply changes the interpretation of the model,
but not its results.
3emerges on the use of this information. Does the principal use it to exploit agents’
naïveté even further or simply to increase the overall economic eﬃciency of con-
tracts?
The model features two periods. A principal hires agents in period 1 to carry
out a task in period 2. Before facing the task they are assigned to, agents have
limited information about their true type and they are assumed to form biased
(wrong) beliefs about it in period 1— i.e. they are naïve. Furthermore, each agent’s
beliefs depend on his actual type — that is, naïveté is type-dependent. While their
naïveté prevents agents from updating their beliefs the principal is fully aware
of the correlation between type and beliefs. The use the principal makes of this
information is the key insight of the paper. In equilibrium, she designs contracts
that, first, screen among diﬀerently naïve agents in period 1 and, second, screen
among diﬀerent types of agent in period 2. Given her formed posterior from period
1 screening, the principal faces a trade-oﬀ: to design eﬃcient contracts either
for the most naïve types, in which case she exploits them, taking advantage of
their wrong beliefs, or for the types she deems most probable given her posteriors,
therefore maximising eﬃciency regardless of naïveté levels.
The model can be applied to job market contracts, job interviews, procurement
(where bids can be assumed to convey a level of ‘confidence’ the seller has in
his ability to provide the service) or any economic situation where the level of
confidence of an agent is assumed to transmit some information about the agent.4
Finally, although the evidence shows the existence of a correlation between be-
liefs and ability, the evidence on the direction of this correlation is mixed and not
unanimous. For this reason, in the paper, I consider all interesting directions (and
magnitudes) of correlation.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2 I present the related literature. In
section 3 I explain the model and the assumptions. In section 4 I study the case of
perfect correlation between naïveté and agents’ types. I then relax this assumption
and study the general case in section 5. I conclude the paper in section 6. All proofs
of lemmas, results and propositions are relegated to the Appendix.
2. Related Literature
Extensive experimental evidence motivates the main assumption behind this
work. A first set of papers (among others: Svenson, 1981; Chi, Glaser, and Rees,
1982; Dunning and Kruger, 1999; Dunning, Ehrlinger, Johnson, and Kruger, 2003;
4For example, think about the junior academic market, where in interviews candidates are often
asked: “howmuch do you expect to be oﬀered given the advertised wage range?”. The question can
be thought of as an attempt at learning the level of confidence of the canditate. This is because the
interviewer may believe that there is a correlation between the candidate’s confidence and quality.
4Banner, Dunning, Ehrlinger, Kerri, and Kruger, 2008) show that the skills needed
to evaluate competence in a specific domain are exactly the same as those re-
quired to engender this competence. Hence, individuals without such skills should
find it relatively hard to estimate their own competence correctly. Building on
these findings, a second set of papers (Dittrich, Güth, and Marciejovsky, 2005;
Banks, Lawson, and Logvin, 2007; Moore and Healy, 2008; Ferraro, 2010) present
further experimental evidence of a positive correlation between competence and
self-awareness. Finally, a third set of papers (Lichtenstein, Fischoﬀ, and Phillips,
1982; Loewenstein, O’Donoghue, and Rabin, 2003; Conlin, O’Donoghue, and Vo-
gelsang, 2007) focus on the concept of ‘over-confidence’ and projection-bias pro-
viding strong experimental evidence on bias individuals’ expectations.5
The contributions listed above highlight two main facts: (i) individuals are not
perfectly capable of estimating their own skills; and (ii) often their estimation of
their capabilities depends on the same skills they are trying to evaluate. To date,
the economics literature has only dealt with these facts separately.
Harris and Raviv (1979) first studied a model with agents who lack knowledge
about their type. They assume, however, that agents form unbiased beliefs, corre-
sponding with the principal’s ones.6 Self-awareness and naïveté were first intro-
duced by Strotz (1956) and were later applied in contract theory. Among others,
the papers that most relate to this one are Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) and Eliaz and
Spiegler (2008).7 In both papers, time-inconsistent agents diﬀer in their levels of
naïveté, with some of them being perfectly self-aware (sophisticated). In Eliaz and
Spiegler (2006), the employer has full information about consumers’ preferences.
The optimal menu provides a commitment device for sophisticated agents, who
would like to play according to their present preferences, as opposed to their fu-
ture preferences. Relatively naïve agents, instead, are exploited because of their
inability to correctly estimate their actual type. In Eliaz and Spiegler (2008), the
5Less related, Bagues and Perez-Villadoniga (2012) show that these findings extend to the esti-
mation of other people’s skills as well. They use evidence from a field experiment to show that
recruiters prefer to hire applicants with capabilities similar to their own. One of the proposed ex-
planations is that evaluators’ accuracy is higher when evaluating those dimensions in which their
knowledge is greater.
6Their results show that the principal finds it optimal to charge a fixed fee to the agent in exchange
for her profits (hence the name ‘firm-selling’ equilibrium). Full eﬃciency is achieved in this case.
7Other important contributions: O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001), Asheim (2007) and Heidhues and
Köszegi (2010) (among others) study the interaction between naïveté and self-control, modelled as
present-biased preferences. Amador, Werning, and Angeletos (2006) analyse the trade-oﬀ faced
by a multi-self agent who is aware of his time-inconsistency problems, but is not aware of his true
preferences until later periods. Gilpatric (2008) studies the problem ofmoral hazard in the presence
of naïvé agents with time-inconsistent preferences. Less related is Von Thadden and Zhao (2012)
who study a classical principal agent model where agents do not know their action space until a
later stage.
5authors extend the model to one where the employer has priors over consumers’
preference-changes. Hence, two screening processes take place, exactly as in this
paper. The first screening separates diﬀerently self-aware agents; the second sep-
arates with respect to their preferences. In both papers, however, agents’ beliefs
and types are assumed to be independent.
Type-dependent beliefs were first introduced inmodels of “sequential screening”
(Courty and Li, 2000). There, agents hold unbiased beliefs about their type, but the
precision of these beliefs depends on the agents’ type itself. In line with the results
of this paper, Courty and Li (2000) find that optimal contract design depends on
the “informativeness” of agents’ initial knowledge rather than on the principal’s
priors. Unlike the present work, however, they assume non-naïve agents — i.e.
agents with unbiased expectations — leaving no space for exploitation. On the
contrary, the optimal mechanism features “refund contracts”, which grant agents
the option to claim a refund after they learn their true willingness to pay. In recent
years, Courty and Li’s (2000) model has been extended and applied. Among others,
Kovác and Krähmer (2013) study sequential delegation, Deb and Said (2015) study
the case of a principal with limited commitment power, Evans and Reiche (2015)
relax the commitment assumption completely and Grubb (2015) applies the model
to the cellular phone service market.
My model builds on these contributions to study situations where types (or pref-
erences) aﬀect the bias in agents’ beliefs. My results bridge the findings of screen-
ing models with diversely naïve agents (as in Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006, 2008) and
of sequential screening model (as in Courty and Li, 2000), providing a new per-
spective on the connections between these two literatures.
3. The Model
An employer (the principal, she) seeks to hire a worker (the agent, he) from a
population. Workers are hired in period 1 and asked to complete an individual
task in period 2. The outcome of the task depends on the level of eﬀort e ∈ [0, 1]
a worker exerts then. I assume that the level of eﬀort exerted by the worker is
perfectly observable.8
To hire workers, in period 1, the employer oﬀers a set of contracts w(e) : [0, 1]→
R that each worker can either accept or reject. When a worker accepts a contract
in period 1, and exerts eﬀort e in exchange for wage w(e) in period 2, the employer
enjoys profits Π = y(e)− w(e), where y(e) is increasing and concave in e.
8Extending the model to a moral hazard framework where e is partially, or not at all, observable, is
left for future research.
6When a worker accepts a contract, he enjoys utility U j = w(e)− θje, where θj is
the cost of eﬀort and represents a worker’s productivity type. Finally, if a worker
rejects a contract, both he and the employer obtain zero utility/profits.
The population of workers is composed of a portion λ of productive types, who
have θj = θP , and a portion (1− λ) of unproductive types, who have θj = θU > θP .
The first main assumption of the paper is that in period 1 neither the employer
nor the workers are aware of the workers’ productivity types. While the employer
forms unbiased expectations workers have biased heterogeneous beliefs about
themselves, that is, they are naïve. Given this, the employer’s expectation about
a worker’s utility is given by E(θ) = λUP + (1 − λ)UU . A worker’s belief about
his own utility, instead, depends on his belief type. A worker can be optimistic or
pessimistic about his true productivity. In the first case, the agent believes himself
to be a productive type with probability φ > λ, that is Pr{θj = θP} = φ. In the sec-
ond case, he believes himself to be a productive type with probability δ < λ, that is
Pr{θj = θP} = δ. A belief type i expects his productivity to be Ei(θ) = iθP +(1−i)θU ,
i = {φ, δ}. Notice that an agent is considered optimistic (pessimistic) with respect
to the average of the population and not with respect to his actual productivity.9
The second main assumption of the paper, and the one that constitutes the main
departure from the literature, states that a worker’s beliefs and productivity are
not independent. Here, I assume that the distribution of belief types is condi-
tional on a worker’s true productivity. In particular, there is a proportion pP (pU )
of pessimistic types among productive (unproductive) workers. Let B denote the
belief of a worker. Then the employer has priors: pP = Pr{B = δ|θ = θP} and
pU = Pr{B = δ|θ = θU}. This allows her to update her priors on a worker’s produc-
tivity when she knows his belief type.
Workers update their prior only when they face the task. In period 2, they learn
their true productivity before choosing the level of eﬀort to exert.
Given the assumptions above, the employer faces two diﬀerent connected screen-
ing problems. In period 1 she wants to separate workers according to their belief
type. This allows her to update her priors in period 2 and separate workers on
the basis of their productivity type. Notice that the employer and the agents al-
ways have diﬀerent beliefs throughout the game. In period 1, the employer forms
unbiased expectations, while workers rely on their naïve beliefs. In period 2, the
employer updates her priors given the separation of period 1, while workers learn
their true productivity and behave as fully informed agents. This implies that the
maximisation problem the employer solves is subject to period 1 constraints, which
9This is because the productivity-type space is composed of only two types. Hence, if the optimistic
or pessimistic nature of a worker were based on his true productivity, all productive (unproductive)
workers would be pessimistic (optimistic) simply because E(θ) > θP (E(θ) < θU ).
7depend on workers’ belief types, and period 2 constraints which depend on work-
ers’ true productivity types.
Before stating the problem formally, I define (wji , e
j
i ) ≡ (wi(eji ), eji ) as the wage and
eﬀort level that a worker of belief type i and productivity type j chooses in period
2. Notice that workers’ utility only depends on the level of eﬀort they choose (or
believe they will choose) in period 2, and that once they sign a contract they are
constrained to carry out the task — i.e. there is no individual rationality constraint
in period 2. Therefore, I can restrict my attention, without loss of generality, to
four eﬀort levels, and the corresponding wages set by the employer: eUδ , ePδ , eUφ , ePφ .
Given this, the employer solves:
max
{wji }i=δ,φ,j=P,U
E(Π) (1)
s.t. Eδ(U j(wδ(e))) ≥ 0, (IRδ)
Eφ(U
j(wφ(e))) ≥ 0, (IRφ)
Eδ(U
j(wδ(e))) ≥ Eδ(U j(wφ(e))), (ICδ)
Eφ(U
j(wφ(e))) ≥ Eφ(U j(wδ(e))), (ICφ)
UP (wPδ , e
P
δ ) ≥ UP (wUδ , eUδ ), (ICP,δ)
UU(wUδ , e
U
δ ) ≥ UU(wPδ , ePδ ), (ICU,δ)
UP (wPφ , e
P
φ ) ≥ UP (wUφ , eUφ ), (ICP,φ)
UU(wUφ , e
U
φ ) ≥ UU(wPφ , ePφ ). (ICU,φ)
She maximizes her expected profits with respect to two diﬀerent contracts: wδ =
{(wPδ , ePδ ), (wUδ , eUδ )} and wφ = {(wPφ , ePφ ), (wUφ , eUφ )}. These contracts induce separa-
tion among belief types in period 1 and among productivity types in period 2. In
order to achieve this, the contracts have to satisfy eight diﬀerent constraints.
The first two are period 1 individual rationality constraints that ensure that each
belief type is willing to accept the contract designed for him as opposed to his out-
side option. The second two are period 1 incentive compatibility constraints that
induce separation among belief types. Notice that since these four constraints re-
late to period 1, they are expressed in expected utility terms, and the expectations
are weighted by workers’ beliefs.
The last two pairs of constraints are ‘contract specific’ (two for each contract
wi) period 2 incentive compatibility constraints. They ensure that belief type i,
once he has self-selected in period 1 and learned his true productivity in period 2,
chooses the wage/eﬀort pair designed for him. Hence, they are expressed as the
actual utility the worker obtains.
8Notice that the principal does not have to satisfy any period 2 individual ratio-
nality constraint since it is assumed that workers cannot ‘drop out’ of the contract
once it has been signed in period 1.
In the next sections, I solve the problem for the optimal set of contracts oﬀered
by the employer. I do this under diﬀerent assumptions about the level of informa-
tion obtained by knowing a worker’s belief type. I start with the case of a perfect
correlation between the two type dimensions, i.e. when beliefs are perfectly infor-
mative about workers’ productivity. In this case, separation in period 1 perfectly
reveals the agent’s productivity.
Before doing that, however, in order to better express the results let me define
the concepts of exploitation and eﬃciency in line with the terminology in the ex-
isting literature.
Definition 1 (Exploitation). A worker of belief type i and productivity type j is
exploited if
wji − θjeji < 0.
That is, he is exploited if he accepts a contract wi(e) that a fully informed agent of
his same productivity type would not accept.
The concept of exploitation was first introduced in Eliaz and Spiegler (2006).10
It generally applies to a situation where a principal takes advantage of an agent’s
naïveté in order to extract a surplus from him beyond the limits of the IR. In the
context of this paper, a worker may be exploited not because he does not know
his true ability (although he does not), but rather because he has systematically
wrong beliefs about it.
Second, I define eﬃcient levels of eﬀort as the values of e that equate marginal
product to workers’ productivity.11
Definition 2 (Eﬃcient Eﬀort). A worker of belief type i and productivity type j
exerts eﬃcient eﬀort if
eji : y
′(eji ) = θj.
That is, if at eji the marginal product of eﬀort equals the worker’s productivity.
Given this, a contract wi(e) may induce either productive or unproductive work-
ers (or both) to exert eﬃcient levels of eﬀort. Hence, the (classical) definition of
eﬃciency at the top and at the bottom:
Definition 3 (Top vs. Bottom Eﬃciency). A contract wi(e) features eﬃciency at
the top if it induces productive workers to exert the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, i.e.
10Some diﬀerences arise, however, in the source of exploitation, as will be described later on.
11These are the equilibrium eﬀort levels exerted when agents are uninformed about their true type,
but are not naïve (Harris and Raviv, 1979; Laﬀont and Martimort, 2002).
9ePi : y
′(ePi ) = θP . It features eﬃciency at the bottom if it induces unproductive
workers to exert the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, i.e. eUi : y′(eUi ) = θU .
4. Perfectly Informative Beliefs
In this section, I study the case where knowing a worker’s belief perfectly re-
veals his productivity type. This scenario requires that pP and pU belong to {0, 1}
and pP +pU = 1. That is, either all productive workers are optimistic and all unpro-
ductive workers are pessimistic, or vice versa. If all workers were pessimistic (or
optimistic) regardless of their productivity, then no information could be learned
by knowing their beliefs.
The first result shows that separation in period 1 is not aﬀected by the extent, or
direction, of belief-productivity correlation. This is because, at this stage, the em-
ployer has only a prior on workers’ belief types and cannot exploit the correlation
between beliefs and productivity. The next lemma identifies the binding constraints
for period 1.
Lemma 1 (Period 1 Screening). Regardless of the correlation between naïveté and
productivity, the period 1 constraints are such that:
(i) (IRδ) binds while (IRφ) is slack.
(ii) (ICφ) binds while (ICδ) is slack.
Lemma 1 presents findings similar to a classical screening model. In this case,
the optimistic type plays the role of the ‘high type’ while the pessimistic type the
role of the ‘low type’. To see this, notice that what determines period 1’s type
ranking — high vs. low — is not the workers’ actual productivity, but rather their
subjective expectations about it. Therefore, optimistic (pessimistic) workers play
the role of the high (low) type in the population. As in classical screening problems,
optimistic workers’ IR is slack as is the IC of pessimistic types.
Notice also that the employer’s only purpose in inducing separation in period 1
is to be able to form posteriors on workers’ productivity, since she gains no direct
profits from this separation.
Given the above, and substituting for the expected profits and utilities, the prob-
lem that the employer solves is reduced to:
max
{wij}j=δ,φ,i=P,L
λ
[
pP (y(e
P
δ )− wPδ ) + (1− pP )(y(ePφ )− wPφ )
]
+
+(1− λ) [pU(y(eUδ )− wUδ ) + (1− pU)(y(eUφ )− wUφ )] (2)
10
s.t. δ(wPδ − θP ePδ )+(1− δ)(wUδ − θUeUδ ) = 0 (IRδ)
φ(wPφ − θP ePφ ) + (1− φ)(wUφ − θUeUφ ) = φ(wPδ − θP ePδ ) + (1− φ)(wUδ − θUeUδ ) (ICφ)
wPδ − wUδ ≥ θP (ePδ − eUδ ) (ICP,δ)
wPδ − wUδ ≤ θU(ePδ − eUδ ) (ICU,δ)
wPφ − wUφ ≥ θP (ePφ − eUφ ) (ICP,φ)
wPφ − wUφ ≤ θU(ePφ − eUφ ). (ICU,φ)
As expected, period 2 separation depends on the direction (and extent) of the
correlation between beliefs and productivity. The reason for this is that the period
2 ICs are contract-specific. Hence, their relevance depends on the posterior the
employer forms on a specific belief type’s productivity.
I now present the results under two diﬀerent scenarios of perfect correlation. In
the first scenario, I study a positive correlation between beliefs and productivity,
that is, the case of optimistic-productive and pessimistic-unproductive workers.
In the second scenario, I study the opposite case of negative correlation. These
scenarios both have specific features, which are relevant only in the special case
of this section, and more general features which will be revisited in section 5,
where correlation is assumed to be imperfect.
4.1. Perfect Positive Correlation. In this section I study the case of pP = 0 and
pU = 1. Hence, the only types of agent present in the labour force are produc-
tive optimistic, (P, φ), and unproductive pessimistic, (U, δ). While the employer
understands this and behaves accordingly, workers still believe they are part of a
population with four diﬀerent types of workers. That is, they fail to understand
that their beliefs are a perfect indicator of their actual productivity. This creates
an opportunity for the employer to take advantage of workers’ naïveté and exploit
them.
Take the contract for pessimistic workers, for example. The employer sets the
contracts in period 1, when workers are unaware of their true productivity. While
she knows, however, that every pessimistic worker is unproductive, the latter be-
lieve themselves to be productive with a positive probability. This creates two
‘channels’ of exploitation for the employer to use.
First, when facing a contract that extracts a full surplus from unproductive
types, a pessimistic unproductive worker expects to obtain positive utility from
it. To see this, consider any contract for pessimistic types that only oﬀers wδ(eUδ ) =
θUe
U
δ . In period 1, an unproductive pessimistic worker evaluates this contract with
Eδ(Ui(wδ(e))) = θUe
U
δ −Eδ(θ)eUδ > 0. Given this, the employer can decrease the wage
even further, increasing profits, until the (IRδ) binds. A this point, the worker in
11
period 1 expects to obtain zero utility, while in period 2 he faces the truth and
obtains negative utility. He is exploited through the first channel.
The second channel of exploitation takes place through an ‘imaginary oﬀer’
(Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006).
Definition 4 (Imaginary Oﬀer). An imaginary oﬀer is a pair (wji , eji ) never cho-
sen by any worker in equilibrium, but that workers believe they will choose with
positive probability because of their naïveté.
The imaginary oﬀer satisfies incentive compatibility and it is used by the em-
ployer to increase the expected utility of a worker from contract wi(e), while not
increasing the actual utility he obtains. In this section, the imaginary oﬀer in the
contract for the pessimistic worker is set to yield a positive surplus to a produc-
tive type. If it is added to contract wδ(e), in fact, the pessimistic worker assigns
a positive probability to the event of choosing it (and of being a productive type).
This increases his expected utility from contract wδ(e) and allows the employer to
decrease the utility given by the ‘actual oﬀer’ even further, increasing exploitation.
To avoid any confusion, notice that imaginary oﬀers do not aﬀect profits directly
but only through workers’ naïveté. In other words, the employer knows that these
oﬀers are never chosen and hence they are assigned no positive probability in the
expectations of profits. Since workers, however, believe they may choose these of-
fers in period 2 with some positive probability, the equilibrium values of the actual
oﬀers depend on the imaginary oﬀers. Hence, their eﬀect on profits is indirect.
Given the two channels, I define two possible levels of exploitation.
Definition 5 (Mild vs. Strong Exploitation). Exploitation is mild if the employer
does not take advantage of the second channel — i.e. she does not design an
imaginary oﬀer. It is strong if she does so.
In the case of a positive perfect correlation between type dimensions, it is straight-
forward to understand that the period 2 binding constraints are (ICP,φ) and (ICU,δ).
This is because they are intended for the only types that actually exist in the popu-
lation. Nevertheless, in order to take advantage of the two channels of exploitation,
(ICU,φ) and (ICP,δ) should still hold.12
Hence, when belief and productivity are perfectly positively correlated, the em-
ployer solves:
max
{wji }i=δ,φ,j=P,L
λ(y(ePφ )− wPφ ) + (1− λ)(y(eUδ )− wUδ ) (3)
12If they did not, agents would not assign a positive probability to choosing the imaginary oﬀer in
period 2.
12
s.t. δ(wPδ − θP ePδ )+(1− δ)(wUδ − θUeUδ ) = 0 (IRδ)
φ(wPφ − θP ePφ ) + (1− φ)(wUφ − θUeUφ ) = φ(wPδ − θP ePδ ) + (1− φ)(wUδ − θUeUδ ) (ICφ)
wPδ − wUδ = θU(ePδ − eUδ ) (ICU,δ)
wPφ − wUφ = θP (ePφ − eUφ ) (ICP,φ)
wPφ − wUφ ≤ θU(ePφ − eUφ ) (ICU,φ)
wPδ − wUδ ≥ θP (ePδ − eUδ ). (ICP,δ)
First of all, notice that period 2 incentive compatibility for contract wi(e) is pos-
sible as long as (ePi −eUi ) ≥ 0. Once again, recall that this incentive compatibility is
only imaginary since there are no workers with diﬀerent productivity but thesame
belief type.
Solving the binding constraints for wPδ , wUδ , wPφ , wUφ ,
wUδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ + θU(e
U
δ − ePδ ),
wPδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ ,
wUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ + Eφ(θ)eUφ ,
wPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ + Eφ(θ)eUφ − θP (eUφ − ePφ ),
and substituting the relevant solutions in the maximisation, I obtain:
max
{eij}j=δ,φ,i=P,L
λ
(
y(ePφ )− (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ − Eφ(θ)eUφ − θP (ePφ − eUφ )
)
+
+(1− λ) (y(eUδ )− Eδ(θ)ePδ − θU(eUδ − ePδ )) . (4)
From this new problem, the actually chosen levels of eﬀort ePφ and eUδ are easily
calculated to be y′(ePφ ) = θP and y′(eUδ ) = θU . Hence, each worker hired exerts the
eﬃcient level of eﬀort for his productivity type. This result is common to the case of
negatively correlated beliefs and productivity, and it is generalised in Proposition
1 in the next section.
The values of the imaginary oﬀers can also be derived from the maximisation
problem. Starting from the eﬀort level for unproductive optimistic workers, it is
easy to see that the eﬀect of eUφ on profits is negative. Hence, in equilibrium eUφ = 0.
The intuition behind this is that the (wPφ , ePφ ) oﬀer is already inducing an eﬃcient
level of eﬀort. Since the agent believes himself to be an unproductive type with
some positive probability, the imaginary action has to require a low level of eﬀort.
In this way, the worker feels ‘safe’ that if she turns out to be unproductive, she can
always enjoy a small surplus without exerting too much eﬀort; in fact, no eﬀort at
all: eUφ = 0.13
13To see that UUφ > 0 notice that ePδ > 0 as described below. Hence, wUφ > 0 even if eUφ = 0.
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The intuition behind the optimal value for ePδ , and its derivation, instead, are
not so straightforward. On the one hand, a lower ePδ for a given wPδ increases
Eδ(Ui(wδ(e))). This relaxes the IR of the pessimistic unproductive worker, and al-
lows the employer to decrease even further the wage paid to this type, increasing
exploitation and profits. On the other hand, this also increases Eφ(Ui(wδ(e))), vi-
olating the (IC) of the optimistic productive worker. This forces the employer to
increase Eφ(Ui(wφ(e))) by the same amount, decreasing her profits. Which of these
two opposite eﬀects prevails depends on the eﬀect of ePδ on (4). If it is positive,
ePδ is set to the highest possible value, 1. If the eﬀect is negative, ePδ is set to the
lowest possible value. Finally, however, notice that for incentive compatibility to
be possible — i.e. for (ICU,δ) and ICP,δ) to hold, ePδ cannot go below the value of
eUδ . Hence, whether the eﬀect of ePδ on profits is positive or negative does not de-
termine the ‘direction’ of the imaginary oﬀer but rather whether the oﬀer exists
or not. In other words, it determines whether the pessimistic worker expects to be
screened or pooled in period 2.
The eﬀect of a decrease in ePδ on profits depends on the ratio of workers’ beliefs,
i.e. the overall level of naïveté of the worker population. In particular, the greater
the naïveté of the optimistic productive worker, the more he believes he is unpro-
ductive. Hence, the lower the positive eﬀect on Eφ(Ui(wδ(e))) of a decrease in ePδ ,
the stronger is the second channel of exploitation of him. This allows the principal
to let (ICφ) bind again via (wUφ , eUφ ), which does not directly aﬀect her profits. Sim-
ilarly, if φ is high and the productive type is self-aware — i.e. Eφ(θ) is close to θP —
(wUφ , e
U
φ ) has a weaker eﬀect on Eφ(Ui(wφ(e))). Therefore, decreasing ePδ becomes
more costly. Hence, for the use of the second channel to be optimal, the pessimistic
unproductive worker has to be suﬃciently naïve.
This is summarised in Result 1.
Result 1 (Pooling of Pessimistic Workers). When beliefs and productivity are per-
fectly positively correlated, if a pessimistic unproductive worker is naïve enough,
relative to the self-awareness of a optimistic productive worker, that is:
δ
φ
≥ λ, (5)
then the employer uses an imaginary oﬀer (wPδ , ePδ ) for the unproductive type and
exploitation is strong. If not, the employer uses no imaginary oﬀer and exploitation
is mild.
To fully understand Result 1, consider the following. Notice that the LHS of con-
dition (5) corresponds to the naïveté of pessimistic unproductive workers over the
self-awareness of optimistic productive workers. Hence, it can be interpreted as a
measure of workers’ relative naïveté in the population. The higher it is, the more
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the unproductive type believes himself to be productive and the more the produc-
tive worker believes himself to be unproductive. For the condition to hold, the
probability a pessimistic unproductive worker assigns to himself of being produc-
tive has to be larger than the proportion of productive workers in the population.
When condition (5) holds, ePδ = 1 and wPδ = Eδ(θ) and exploitation is strong.
On the contrary, when condition (5) does not hold, either the optimistic produc-
tive worker is too self-aware or the pessimistic unproductive worker is not naïve
enough. The latter’s relative naïveté is lower than the proportion of productive
workers in the population and it is, therefore, too costly to exploit him through the
second channel. No imaginary oﬀer is set in wδ and pessimistic workers expect to
be pooled in period 2.
Given the structure of the contracts described so far, the next result concerns
workers’ welfare.
Result 2 (Exploitation with Perfect Positive Correlation). When beliefs and pro-
ductivity are perfectly positively correlated, productive workers enjoy a positive
rent while unproductive ones are exploited. The rent enjoyed by the former is
larger when exploitation of the latter is strong.
The intuition behind Result 2 follows from the previous discussion. The employer
wants to take advantage of the unproductive workers’ naïveté. Since beliefs and
productivity are perfectly positively correlated, however, she is forced to leave
some positive surplus to the productive worker. The reason for this lies both in
the diﬀerence in beliefs between belief types and in the way the two channels of
exploitation aﬀect the two contracts.
On the one hand, the first channel cannot be used to extract a surplus from the
productive worker. The reason for this is that the latter expects to have a lower
productivity than he actually has: he never accepts a contract that extracts a full
surplus from a productive type because he would expect to get a strictly negative
utility from doing so.
On the other hand, the role of the imaginary oﬀer in the contract for the opti-
mistic type is not to extract more surplus from him but rather to provide him with
a form of ‘insurance’. In other words, it represents a safe option for the optimistic
productive worker to choose in the case that he turns out to be unproductive — an
event that he deems possible with positive probability. Hence, the employer has
no ability to exploit productive workers.
Finally, to understand the intuition behind optimistic workers’ surplus, notice
that an optimistic worker always assigns a larger probability to obtaining UPδ if
he chooses wδ(e) than the pessimistic worker. Hence, any change to wδ(e) that
increases UPδ keeping Eδ(Uj(wδ(e))) constant, increases Eφ(Uj(wδ(e))). For (ICφ) to
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bind, therefore, the utility from the contract for the optimistic type has to increase
when the imaginary oﬀer is added to wδ(e).
Notice that this is in accordance with the intuition behind (5). The greater is
the general level of naïveté in the labour force population — i.e. (5) holds — the
stronger is the exploitation of the unproductive worker.
4.2. Perfect Negative Correlation. In this section, I study the opposite case to
that of section 4.1, namely when pP = 1 and pU = 0. This is the case in which all
productive workers are pessimistic and all unproductive workers are optimistic.
To understand the framework I have in mind, consider the case of a population
of newly graduated students looking for their first job. Grades and degrees can
explain a lot about knowledge of topics and intelligence, but when it comes to in-
nate ability, speed of adaptation, productivity and so on, there is nothing like true
practice to give an indication of one’s capabilities. Suppose that the students have
a degree in financial economics and they are all looking for a job in the financial
sector. They all apply for jobs according only to their expectations about their own
productivity. Once a job is obtained, however, they learn their true productivity and
choose the amount of eﬀort to exert in the job accordingly. Some of the students
have a passion for finance: they read the news, understand the mechanics and
complexities of markets and would be perfect for a job in the financial sector (pro-
ductive types). Others, instead, have chosen that specific course of study without
having a deep interest in financial markets. Hence, they would be a less perfect
match for a financial firm (unproductive types). In this section, I assume that un-
derstanding the complexities of the job and the mechanisms of financial markets
without having a clear perception of one’s own capability hurts self-confidence and
creates a generally pessimistic feeling about one success in themarket (pessimistic
productive workers). A candidate who does not comprehend these complexities,
instead, has a relatively arrogant attitude. He is convinced that the job will be easy
(optimistic unproductive workers).
To derive the solution to this problem, it is easy to follow the same procedure as
in section 4.1 but now, however, the period 2 binding constraints are (ICP,δ) and
(ICU,φ). Hence, the problem becomes:
max
{wji }i=δ,φ,j=P,L
λ(y(ePδ )− wPδ ) + (1− λ)(y(eUφ )− wUφ ) (6)
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s.t. δ(wPδ − θP ePδ ) + (1− δ)(wUδ −θUeUδ ) = 0 (IRδ)
φ(wPφ − θP ePφ ) + (1− φ)(wUφ − θUeUφ ) = φ(wPδ − θP ePδ ) + (1− φ)(wUδ − θUeUδ ) (ICφ)
wPφ − wUφ = θU(ePφ − eUφ ) (ICU,φ)
wPδ − wUδ = θP (ePδ − eUδ ) (ICP,δ)
wPδ − wUδ ≤ θU(ePδ − eUδ ) (ICU,δ)
wPφ − wUφ ≥ θP (ePφ − eUφ ). (ICP,φ)
Solving the binding constraints for wPδ , wUδ , wPφ , wUφ ,
wUδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ , (7)
wPδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ − θP (eUδ − ePδ ), (8)
wUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ + Eφ(θ)ePφ + θU(eUφ − ePφ ), (9)
wPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ + Eφ(θ)ePφ , (10)
and substituting the relevant solutions in the maximisation, I obtain:
max
{eij}j=δ,φ,i=P,L
λ(y(ePδ )− Eδ(θ)eUδ + θP (eUδ − ePδ ))+
(1− λ)(y(eUφ )− (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ − Eφ(θ)ePφ − θU(eUφ − ePφ )). (11)
From the maximisation problem, the chosen levels of eﬀort ePδ and eUφ correspond
to y′(ePδ ) = θP and y′(eUφ ) = θU . As in section 4.1, all workers exert eﬃcient levels
of eﬀort.
Proposition 1 (Full Eﬃciency). When beliefs and productivity are perfectly cor-
related, full eﬃciency is always achieved regardless of the direction of the corre-
lation. That is, both productive and unproductive workers choose first-best levels
of eﬀort, regardless of their beliefs.
If workers were naïve but the correlation between beliefs and productivity were
not perfect, then even after updating her beliefs, the employer would not be able
to precisely tell the productivity type of a worker. Hence, she would assign positive
probability to all possible combinations of belief and productivity types. I derive
the equilibrium for this case in section 5.
To derive the equilibrium values of imaginary oﬀers in the case of a perfect neg-
ative correlation, notice from (11) that the eﬀect of eUδ is always negative and the
eﬀect of ePφ is always positive. Hence, eUδ = 0 while ePφ = 1.14
To see why the eﬀort level for the optimistic productive type has positive eﬀects
on profits, simply notice that in this framework optimistic workers are always un-
productive. Hence, the second channel of exploitation is more powerful than ever
14This ensures that contracts are incentive compatibile.
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and the employer uses an imaginary oﬀer that grants the largest possible incen-
tive compatible surplus to a hypothetical optimistic productive type. Also note that
since the actual productive worker is always pessimistic he assigns to this oﬀer a
much smaller weight than the optimistic productive worker when evaluating wφ(e).
As for the eﬀort level of the pessimistic unproductive type, the intuition is un-
changed from section 4.1.
Given all the above, I can derive the equivalent of Result 2 for the case of per-
fectly negatively correlated types.
Result 3 (Exploitation with Perfect Negative Correlation). When beliefs and pro-
ductivity are perfectly negatively correlated, pessimistic productive workers ob-
tain zero surplus while optimistic unproductive ones are exploited. Exploitation is
always strong.
Result 3 shows a peculiar feature of this case: pessimistic productive workers
enjoy no positive rent. Their pessimistic naïveté is large enough to allow the em-
ployer to extract all their surplus, but not large enough for them to be exploited.
This is because in period 1 pessimistic productive workers play the role of the low
type— they obtain zero expected utility. Hence, the employer can extract a full sur-
plus from them by oﬀering a contract that ensures zero utility to both productivity
types.
Optimistic unproductive types, on the other hand, can be screened away from
wδ(e) with the promise of a higher utility in the event of being productive and a
lower one in the event of being unproductive, that is, by introducing an imaginary
oﬀer that grants positive utility to productive types and negative utility to unpro-
ductive types.
In other words, while in section 4.1 (ICφ) acts as a ‘proper constraint’ on the level
of exploitation of the unproductive type, here it acts as a means of exploitation. It
is through (ICφ) that the employer can separate the unproductive type and take
advantage of his naïveté.
To conclude this section, I present a corollary to Results 2 and 3 that compares
welfare findings.
Corollary 1 (Perfect Correlation Welfare). When beliefs and productivity are per-
fectly correlated, both productive and unproductive workers obtain lower utility
when the correlation is negative.
Corollary 1 is quite intuitive. When the correlation is negative, naïveté plays a
much larger role and the productive worker loses all potential information rent.
The employer uses the two channels of exploitation to their maximum eﬀect.
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To compare these findings with classical results, notice that if workers were
not naïve but formed homogeneous unbiased expectations about their productiv-
ity (also known as the “selling of the firm” equilibrium, Laﬀont and Martimort,
2002; Harris and Raviv, 1979, where the worker becomes the residual claimant of
the firm’s profits), the employer would not be able to strongly exploit workers, but
would still be able to achieve full eﬃciency. If instead workers were fully informed
about their true productivity, the classical screening literature tells us that eﬃ-
ciency would only be achieved at the top and that productive workers would enjoy
positive rents.
Hence, an agent’s imperfect information about his productivity allows the em-
ployer to exploit agents. Naïveté on its own allows her to use the second channel
of exploitation at the cost of full eﬃciency. A perfect correlation between beliefs
and productivity enables her to achieve full eﬃciency and, if the correlation is
negative, to extract all of the surplus from the productive types while still strongly
exploiting unproductive workers.
5. Imperfectly Informative Beliefs
In this section, I study the general case where beliefs are imperfectly informa-
tive. More precisely, both productive and unproductive workers have a positive
probability of being either optimistic or pessimistic, i.e. pP , pU /∈ {0, 1}.15
As described in section 2, the basic intuition from the literature on contracting
with naïve agents when there is no correlation between beliefs and productivity
shows that the principal designs contracts that induce eﬃcient eﬀort in states —
productivity types in my model — that agents deem less likely than the princi-
pal does (Eliaz and Spiegler, 2006, 2008). Exploitation also takes place in these
states. Hence, in my model, eﬃciency would be at the top in the contract for the
pessimistic worker and at the bottom in that for the optimistic worker.
After the introduction of type-dependent naïveté, however, this result carries
over only partially and a new one holds for part of the parameter space. As I
show in this section, the employer may find it optimal to induce a worker of belief
i and productivity type j to exert the eﬃcient level of eﬀort, not because of a
misalignment of beliefs between her and the worker but rather because of her
posterior that a belief type i is indeed a productivity type j.
When beliefs are imperfectly informative, the employer has a prior that assigns
positive probability to each possible combination of beliefs and productivity type.
15Notice that the case where the correlation between beliefs and productivity is perfect for only
one productivity/belief pair is not analysed in the paper. Solutions for these cases, however, can be
derived by combining the findings of this section with those of section 4. They present no further
insights into the employer’s optimal contracting behaviour.
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Hence, she solves problem (2). Period 2 incentive compatibility this time, however,
is not as straightforward as before.
First of all, which incentive compatibility constraint is binding depends on the
posteriors of the employer, given that workers have self-selected in period 1.
Second, notice that, as in classical screening problems, if (ICj,i) binds then the
contract designed for an belief type i induces the eﬃcient level of eﬀort. Hence, de-
riving conditions for the IC constraints binding in period 2 also indicates whether
eﬃciency for belief type i is at the top or at the bottom. I start with the contract
designed for optimistic workers.
Result 4 (Eﬃciency for Optimistic Workers). If the employer has a strong updated
belief that optimistic workers are productive, or the naïveté of unproductive opti-
mistic workers is low enough, eﬃciency is at the top in the contract for optimistic
workers. That is, if
Pr{θ = θP |B = φ}1−φφ ≥ Pr{θ = θU |B = φ}, (12)
then y′(ePφ ) = θP .
Result 4 (together with Result 5 below) represents the new trade-oﬀ that the
principal faces on the use of the information granted by the type-dependancy of
agents’ naïveté.
The employer has twomain objectives: to induce eﬃcient levels of eﬀort in work-
ers — maximising the pie — and to extract as much surplus as she can — taking
the pie away from the agents. The second is, of course, easier to achieve when
facing agents with particularly wrong beliefs about themselves since, as shown in
section 4, naïveté increases exploitation. When considering optimistic workers,
these types are the unproductive ones and the ratio φ
1−φ (which is increasing in φ)
then becomes a measure of their naïveté. Its inverse measures the self-awareness
of optimistic unproductive workers. This makes the intuition behind condition (12)
easy to identify.
In order to maximise the pie, the principal would like to induce eﬃcient eﬀort in
the type of worker she believes she is facing. Hence, she compares her posteriors
about a worker being productive or unproductive given that he is optimistic. When
the optimistic unproductive worker is naïve enough, however, inducing him to exert
eﬃcient eﬀort becomes less costly. This creates a further incentive to set y′(eUφ ) =
θU . In order for eﬃciency at the top to be optimal in the contract for optimistic
workers then, it is not enough for the monopolist to believe that an optimistic
worker is most probably (in posterior terms) productive. It is also necessary for
optimistic unproductive workers to be relatively self-aware (i.e. φ has to be low
enough).
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A graphical intuition for Result 4 is represented in Figure 1. In the figure con-
straints (ICφ), (ICU,φ) and (ICP,φ) are plotted, together with isoprofits, in (wUφ , wPφ )
space. Condition (12) holds in the graph on the right and fails in the graph on the
left. Notice that profits increase towards the bottom left in each graph and that in-
centive compatible (both for period 1 and period 2) contracts lie in the area above
(ICφ) and between (ICU,φ) and (ICP,φ).
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Figure 1. Optimistic Workers’ Eﬃciency
In the figure (ICφ), (ICU,φ), (ICP,φ) and isoprofits are plotted in
(wUφ , w
P
φ ) space. When condition (12) fails — left-hand graph — iso-
profits are steeper than (ICφ). When condition (12) holds — right-
hand graph — they are flatter than (ICφ). Profits of the employer
increase towards the bottom left of the graphs.
In the graph on the left, the posterior of the employer on an optimistic worker
being unproductive is strong. Hence, an increase in wUφ bites more on profits than
the same increase inwPφ . Hence, the isoprofits are steeper than the (ICφ) constraint
and eﬃciency is at the bottom in the contract for optimistic workers. In the graph
on the right, the opposite intuition applies.
A similar result is true for pessimistic workers:
Result 5 (Eﬃciency for Pessimistic Workers). If the employer has a strong up-
dated belief that pessimistic workers are unproductive, or the naïveté of produc-
tive pessimistic workers is low enough, eﬃciency is at the bottom in the contract
for pessimistic worker. That is, if
Pr{θ = θU |B = δ} δ1−δ ≥ Pr{θ = θP |B = δ}, (13)
then y′(eUδ ) = θU .
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Condition (13) is themirror image of (12) for pessimistic workers. Notice that the
naïveté of pessimistic productive workers is measured by 1−δ
δ
, which is decreasing
in δ. Its inversemeasures their self-awareness. The lower δ the larger the naïveté of
productive pessimistic workers. Figure 2 below shows a similar graphical intuition
to the one in Figure 1.
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Figure 2. Pessimistic Workers’ Eﬃciency
In the figure (IRδ), (ICU,δ), (ICP,δ) and isoprofits are plotted in
(wUδ , w
P
δ ) space. When condition (13) fails — left-han graph — isoprof-
its are flatter than (IRδ) and eﬃciency is at the top in wδ(e). When
condition (13) holds— right-hand graph— they are steeper than (IRδ)
and eﬃciency is at the bottom. The employer’s profits increase to-
wards the bottom left of the graphs.
To fully understand the importance of the correlation between beliefs and pro-
ductivity, notice that, if they were perfectly independent conditions (12) and (13)
would become 1−λ
λ
≤ 1−φ
φ
and λ
1−λ ≤ δ1−δ respectively. By assumption, these would
never hold. Since the employer would gain no information from screening in pe-
riod 1, she would focus on extracting surplus and inducing the most naïve workers
in the population to exert eﬃcient eﬀort — following the intuition from Eliaz and
Spiegler (2006, 2008).
Ultimately, conditions (12) and (13) define the equilibrium of the model. To-
gether, they determine the optimal behaviour of the employer and identify which
of the two competing eﬀects (exploiting workers’ naïveté vs. inducing eﬃciency in
the most common productivity type) dominates. I present this result in Proposition
2 and then analyse it in the (pU , pP ) space for given values of δ, λ and φ.
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Proposition 2 (Imperfect Correlation Eﬃciency). Given the correlation between
beliefs and productivity, the principal uses the information provided by period 1
screening in order to:
- maximise eﬃciency — eﬃciency is at the top (bottom) in the contract for
optimistic (pessimistic) workers — when both conditions (12) and (13) hold;
- better exploit the most naïve agents in the market — eﬃciency is at the
bottom (top) in the contract for optimistic (pessimistic) workers — when
both conditions fail.
Proposition 2 describes the main trade-oﬀ faced by the employer and states the
main contribution of the paper. It follows from combining Results 4 and 5. To
understand the proposition, consider Figure 3.
First of all, notice that two further cases are implied by Proposition 2. When
condition (12) holds and (13) fails, eﬃciency is at the top in both contracts, while
in the opposite case, eﬃciency is at the bottom in both contracts. These are inter-
mediate situations where the correlation between beliefs and productivity is such
that the result of the trade-oﬀ is diﬀerent for the two contracts.
The basic parameters of the model are δ, λ, φ, pP and pU . The first three simply
describe the relation between optimistic and pessimistic workers and the propor-
tion of productive types in the population. The last two, instead, are the focus of
the paper and determine the level of information about productivity obtained by
knowing a worker’s beliefs, i.e. the extent of naïveté type-dependence. In Figure 3,
I assume δ = 1
3
, λ = 1
2
and φ = 2
3
and study the equilibrium of the model in (pU , pP )
space.
The 45◦ line in the graph separates the area of positive correlation below the
line, from that of negative correlation above the line. It also corresponds to a
model without type-dependent naïveté.
In area A, optimal contracts feature eﬃciency at the top for the pessimistic
worker and at the bottom for the optimistic one. Corollary 2 shows that this area
always occupies the entire portion of the parameter space where beliefs and pro-
ductivity are negatively correlated for every δ < λ < φ. This is perfectly in line
with the findings in the literature, discussed in section 2, and agrees with the intu-
ition that employers induce workers with wrongly biased beliefs to exert eﬃcient
eﬀort, while distorting oﬀers for more self-aware types. Notice that if the type di-
mensions were independent, pP and pU would be equal. Hence, the 45◦ line would
be the parameter space and area A would characterise all the equilibria.
Corollary 2 (Eﬃciency with Negative Correlation). When beliefs and productivity
are negatively correlated, the contract for pessimistic workers features eﬃciency
at the top while that for optimistic workers features eﬃciency at the bottom.
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Figure 3. Eﬃciency in Optimal Contracting
In the figure, conditions (12) and (13) are plotted in (pU , pP ) space.
To the left of the bold line, condition (12) fails and the contract for
optimistic workers features eﬃciency at the bottom. To the right of
it the condition holds and the contract features eﬃciency at the top,
instead. Above the thin line, condition (13) fails and the contract for
pessimistic workers features eﬃciency at the top. Below it, the condi-
tion holds and the contract features eﬃciency at the bottom, instead.
This corollary is proven by studying conditions (12) and (13) when pP > pU . When
beliefs and productivity are negatively correlated, the cost of extracting eﬃcient
levels of eﬀort from optimistic unproductive workers and pessimistic productive
workers is low. It is so low, in fact, that even when the chances of meeting such
types are low (according to her updated beliefs) the employer still finds it optimal
to extract a surplus from these workers nevertheless.16
The area below the 45◦ line is divided in four zones: a portion of area A; area
B, where eﬃciency is at the bottom in both contracts; area C, where eﬃciency is
at the top for optimistic and at the bottom for pessimistic workers; and area D,
where eﬃciency is at the top for both belief types.
Consider a transition from area A to area B. The naïveté parameters remain
unchanged from area A. What does change, however, is the expected naïveté of
a pessimistic worker, since the probability of meeting a pessimistic worker who is
16Notice that a negative correlation between belief and probability happens in the area of the graph
above the 45◦ line. Hence, however small, there is a strictly positive probability that these types
exist.
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productive is relatively low. When pP is small, the number of pessimistic workers
that turn out to be productive is low. Hence, after the screening of period 1, the
employer updates her priors and induces pessimistic unproductive workers to ex-
ert eﬃcient eﬀort rather than the pessimistic productive ones. In other words, the
chances that a pessimistic worker is productive are so small that the benefits of
extracting eﬃcient eﬀort from such a type are negligible.
Contracts in area D follow from the exact opposite intuition. The employer’s
posterior on facing an unproductive worker given that the latter is optimistic are
very small. Hence, she designs a contract with eﬃciency at the top for optimistic
workers.
Finally, area C represents the case where workers have beliefs that are strongly
positively correlated with their productivity — strong enough, that for the assumed
levels of naïveté, the principal uses the information from period 1 screening to
design more eﬃcient contracts. She therefore disregards (to some extent) the
exploitation opportunities created by naïveté. In this area, the optimal contracts
resemble, in eﬃciency terms, those in section 4.1.
In Appendix A, I derive the optimal contracts for all the possible cases described.
Given the solutions found, the next result studies the case of pessimistic types
bunching, while the following corollary studies workers’ welfare.
First of all, although in the case of imperfectly informative beliefs there are no
imaginary oﬀers, the oﬀers set for workers whose period 2 IC are not binding
play a similar role. If the employer wants to exploit the pessimistic unproductive
type, for example, through oﬀer (wPδ , ePδ ), she is still capable of doing so. This time,
however, oﬀer (wPδ , ePδ ) has a first-order direct eﬀect on profits. This is because
pessimistic productive workers do exist and the employer’s priors on a worker
being such a type are given by pPλ. Hence, designing a contract that screens
among diﬀerently productive pessimistic workers in period 2 may be suboptimal.
Unlike section 4.1, this is regardless of the direction of the correlation between
beliefs and productivities.
The higher the naïveté of pessimistic productive workers, relative to that of op-
timistic productive workers, the higher is the gain from using (wPδ , ePδ ) for exploita-
tion. When the proportion of optimistic workers is high, however, period 1 sep-
aration becomes too costly — in terms of the higher expected utility granted to
optimistic workers.
Result 6 (Pooling of Pessimistic Workers). When beliefs and productivity are im-
perfectly correlated, if a pessimistic productive worker is naïve enough — relative
to a optimistic unproductive one — or if the proportion of optimistic workers is
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small, that is
δ
φ
≥ Pr{φ}, (14)
then the employer separates pessimistic workers on the basis of their productivity.
Otherwise, they are bunched together.
Result 6 is reminiscent of Result 1. When the expected utility of wδ(e) increases
— as a consequence of a rise in the utility granted by (wPδ , ePδ ) — in order to sepa-
rate the optimistic workers from the pessimistic ones, the employer has to increase
the expected utility coming from wφ(e). This is regardless of the actual productiv-
ity of the optimistic workers. Furthermore, since the optimistic workers weight
(wPδ , e
P
δ ) more than the pessimistic ones, the increase in expected utility granted
to optimistic workers can oﬀset the profit gains from using (wPδ , ePδ ) to exploit the
pessimistic unproductive workers. This happens when condition (14) fails.
The next corollary shows that the qualitative results on workers’ welfare are
common to all four areas.
Corollary 3 (Imperfect Correlation Welfare). When beliefs are imperfectly infor-
mative about workers’ productivity, unproductive workers are always exploited
while productive workers enjoy a non-negative surplus.
Corollary 3 follows from the proof of Lemma 1. Hence, the result is qualitatively
unaﬀected by the direction and extent of the correlation between beliefs and pro-
ductivity. Qualitative welfare results are unchanged regardless of the information
gained from beliefs on productivity levels.
Since in period 1 the employer only has priors on agents’ belief types, she cannot
take advantage of the correlation between type dimensions. In period 2, however,
she can update her beliefs and set oﬀers that aﬀect the extent of the exploitation
of unproductive workers and the amount of surplus granted to productive ones.
6. Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper has been to study the optimal contracting behaviour
of a principal who faces agents with type-dependent nav¨ieté. In particular, I have
focused on the role the information provided by the type dependency plays in the
design of optimal contracts. There are two main implications of this new assump-
tion.
First, when workers’ beliefs are perfectly informative of their productivity, full
eﬃciency is achieved. Unproductive workers are always exploited. Productive
workers enjoy a positive surplus if their beliefs are positively correlated with their
productivity. If the two are negatively correlated, instead, they enjoy no informa-
tion rent.
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The secondmain result highlights the trade-oﬀ faced by the principal in using the
information gained by screening among diﬀerent belief types in period 1, when the
type dependency is not perfect. In this case, the principal designs contracts that
extract eﬃcient eﬀort levels either from the most naïve workers in the population,
maximising exploitation, or from the type of worker she deems she is most likely
to face given her posteriors, maximising eﬃciency.
These findings connect the literature on sequential screening (Courty and Li,
2000, inter alia) with the literature on contracting with naïve agents (Eliaz and
Spiegler, 2006, 2008) by assuming that agent naïveté depends on the agents’ true
nature (as in sequential screening problems).
Eliaz and Spiegler (2008) define a speculative contract as one that grants a
worker with beliefs i expected utility of λ(wPi − θP ePi ) + (1 − λ)(wUi − θUeUi ) < 0.
In other words, a contract is speculative if it should not be signed by a worker
with unbiased beliefs. In this paper, I have been able to prove that an optimistic
(pessimistic) worker never (always) signs a speculative contract. This, however,
does not save (condemn) him from (to) obtaining zero (negative) surplus.
This result follows from the assumption that one of the period 2 ‘states of the
world’, i.e. the two levels of productivity, dominates the other. In other words, for
any level of eﬀort e′, the utility a productive worker obtains from (w(e′), e′) is always
higher than the utility obtained by an unproductive worker. This assumption is not
present in Eliaz and Spiegler (2006, 2008). The study of what would happen in
a framework of type-dependent naïveté with unordered period 2 states is left for
future work.
An extension of the present model with a continuum of belief types, and the as-
sumption of heterogeneous distributions of beliefs among equally productive work-
ers are work in progress. In addition, of interest for future research is a relaxation
of the assumption on the perfect observability of e, introducing a moral hazard
problem into the model.
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Appendix A. Imperfectly Informative Beliefs — Optimal Contracts
In this appendix, I present the solutions of problem (2) for every value of pP and
pU , that is, for all possible combinations generated by conditions (12) and (13). I
also derive workers’ utility in each equilibrium. Notice that the ranking and sign
of workers’ utility levels is proven in Lemma 1.
In what follows, I define U ji as the utility a worker of productivity type j and
belief type i obtains at the end of the game: U ji ≡ Uj(wji , eji ) = wji − θjeji .
If conditions (12) and (13) fail together, the optimal contracts designed for area
A are obtained by solving (2) with (ICU,φ) and (ICP,δ) binding. This results in:
wUδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ (15)
wPδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ + θP (e
P
δ − eUδ ) (16)
wUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ + Eφ(θ)ePφ + θU(eUφ − ePφ ) (17)
wPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ + Eφ(θ)ePφ (18)
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and
eUδ : y
′(e) = Eδ(θ)−(1−E(p))Eφ(θ)−pPλθP
(1−λ)pU (19)
ePδ : y
′(e) = θP (20)
eUφ : y
′(e) = θU (21)
ePφ : y
′(e) = (1−E(p))Eφ(θ)−(1−λ)(1−pU )θU
(1−pP )λ . (22)
This results in:
UUδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ − θUeUδ < 0 (23)
UPδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ − θP eUδ > 0 (24)
UUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ − (θU − Eφ(θ))ePφ ≤ 0 (25)
UPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ − (θP − Eφ(θ))ePφ > 0. (26)
If condition (12) fails while (13) holds, the optimal contracts designed for area
B are obtained by solving (2) with (ICU,φ) and (ICU,δ) binding. This results in:
wUδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ − θU(ePδ − eUδ ) (27)
wPδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ (28)
wUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ + Eφ(θ)ePφ + θU(eUφ − ePφ ) (29)
wPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ + Eφ(θ)ePφ (30)
and
eUδ : y
′(e) = θU (31)
ePδ : y
′(e) = Eδ(θ)−(1−E(p))Eφ(θ)−pP (1−λ)θU
λpU
(32)
eUφ : y
′(e) = θU (33)
ePφ : y
′(e) = (1−E(p))Eφ(θ)−(1−λ)(1−pP )θU
(1−pU )λ . (34)
This results in:
UUδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ − θUePδ < 0 (35)
UPδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ − θP ePδ > 0 (36)
UUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ − (θU − Eφ(θ))ePφ ≤ 0 (37)
UPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ − (θU − Eφ(θ))ePφ > 0. (38)
If conditions (12) and (13) holds together, the optimal contracts designed for
area C are obtained by solving (2) with (ICP,φ) and (ICU,δ) binding. This results in:
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wUδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ − θU(ePδ − eUδ ) (39)
wPδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ (40)
wUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ + Eφ(θ)eUφ (41)
wPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ + Eφ(θ)eUφ + θP (ePφ − eUφ ). (42)
and
eUδ : y
′(e) = θU (43)
ePδ : y
′(e) = Eδ(θ)−(1−E(p))Eφ(θ)−pP (1−λ)θU
λpU
(44)
eUφ : y
′(e) = (1−E(p))Eφ(θ)−λ(1−pU )θP
(1−pP )(1−λ) (45)
ePφ : y
′(e) = θP . (46)
This results in:
UUδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ − θUePδ < 0 (47)
UPδ = Eδ(θ)e
P
δ − θP ePδ > 0 (48)
UUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ − (θU − Eφ(θ))eUφ ≤ 0 (49)
UPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ − (θU − Eφ(θ))eUφ > 0. (50)
Finally, if condition (12) holds while (13) fails, the optimal contracts designed for
area D are obtained by solving (2) with (ICP,φ) and (ICP,δ) binding. This results in:
wUδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ (51)
wPδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ + θP (e
P
δ − eUδ ) (52)
wUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ + Eφ(θ)eUφ (53)
wPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ + Eφ(θ)eUφ + θP (ePφ − eUφ ). (54)
and
eUδ : y
′(e) = Eδ(θ)−(1−E(p))Eφ(θ)−pUλθP
(1−λ)pP (55)
ePδ : y
′(e) = θP (56)
eUφ : y
′(e) = (1−E(p))Eφ(θ)−λ(1−pU )θP
(1−λ)(1−pP ) (57)
ePφ : y
′(e) = θP . (58)
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This results in:
UUδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ − θUeUδ < 0 (59)
UPδ = Eδ(θ)e
U
δ − θP eUδ > 0 (60)
UUφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))ePδ − (θU − Eφ(θ))eUφ ≤ 0 (61)
UPφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ − (θP − Eφ(θ))eUφ > 0. (62)
Appendix B. Proof of Lemma 1
(1) First of all, UPi ≥ max{0, UUi }. To see this, notice that from ICP,i: UPi ≥
wUi − θP eUi ≥ UUi for all e, with strict inequality for all e > 0. Moreover, suppose
UUi < 0, UPi > 0 is implied by the (IRJ). Using the above, the (IRδ), the (ICφ) and
the fact that φ > δ, I can write the following sequence of inequalities:
φUPφ + (1− φ)UUφ ≥ φUPδ + (1− φ)UUδ ≥ δUPδ + (1− δ)UUδ ≥ 0,
which proves that (IRφ) holds.
Suppose now that (IRδ) was not binding. Then, the principal can decrease all
wages in the contract by  > 0 without aﬀecting any of the other constraints but
raising profits.
(2) Given the above, UPδ ≥ 0 ≥ UUδ . Rearrange the ICs in the following way:
δ(UPδ − UPφ ) + (1− δ)(UUδ − UUφ ) ≥ 0 (ICδ)
φ(UPδ − UPφ ) + (1− φ)(UUδ − UUφ ) ≤ 0. (ICφ)
This shows that the sign of the convex combination between (UPδ −UPφ ) and (UUδ −
UUφ ) changes from non-negative to non-positive when the combination comes closer
to (UPδ − UPφ ) instead of (UUδ − UUφ ). This implies that (UPδ − UPφ ) ≤ 0 and that
(UUδ − UUφ ) ≥ 0, which implies UPφ ≥ UPδ ≥ 0 ≥ UUδ ≥ UUφ .
Suppose now (ICφ) was not binding. Then the principal could decrease both eUφ
and ePφ keeping period 2 incentive compatibility unchanged. In this way, profits
would rise, (ICδ) would be relaxed and (IRφ) would still hold by the lemma above.
To see that (ICδ) is slack, rearrange the ICs in the following way:
δ(UPδ − UUδ ) + UUδ ≥ δ(UPφ − UUφ ) + UUφ (ICδ)
φ(UPφ − UUφ ) + UUφ = φ(UPδ − UUδ ) + UUδ (ICφ)
From (ICφ), UUφ = φ(UPδ −UUδ ) +UUδ −φ(UPφ −UUφ ). Substitute it back into the (ICδ)
to get: (UPφ − UUφ ) ≥ (UPδ − UUδ ), which always holds given Lemma 2.
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Appendix C. Proof of Result 1
Consider the principal objective function as in (4). Notice that the eﬀect of ePδ
is given by λEφ(θ) + (1− λ)θU − Eδ(θ), which is positive if and only if condition (5)
holds. Hence, if that is the case, (wPδ , ePδ ) = (Eδ(θ), 1).
If, instead, (5), then the employer wants to set ePδ as low as possible. However, ex-
post incentive compatibility implies that ePδ ≥ eUδ . Hence, (wPδ , ePδ ) = (Eδ(θ)eUδ , eUδ )
and the contract for δ induces (imaginary) pooling.
Appendix D. Proof of Result 2
To prove the statement, simply work out the wage levels and notice that: if (5)
holds:
wUδ − θUeUδ = (Eδ(θ)− θU) < 0
wPφ − θP ePφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ)) > 0.
If it does not hold:
wUδ − θUeUδ = (Eδ(θ)− θU)eUδ ∈ [(Eδ(θ)− θU), 0]
wPφ − θP ePφ = (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))eUδ ∈ [0, (Eδ(θ)− Eφ(θ))].
Appendix E. Proof of Result 3
To prove the statement simply work out the wage levels and notice that:
wUφ − θUeUφ = (Eφ(θ)− θU) < 0
wPδ − θP ePδ = θP ePδ − θP ePδ = 0.
Appendix F. Proof of Result 4
The employer wants to design incentive compatible contracts thatmaximise prof-
its. From Lemma 1 I know that (IRδ) and (ICφ) have to bind in period 1. The first
is irrelevant for the optimistic workers’ contract.
I can represent incentive compatibility in a (wUφ , wPφ ) space as in Figure 1 in the
paper. Incentive compatible contracts lie above the (ICφ) between (ICU,φ) and
(ICP,φ). The expected utility increases towards the top right and profits towards
the bottom left. Hence, an optimal contract always lies on the (ICφ) binding line. In
order to select the optimal contract, I study the slope of the isoprofits, in a (wUφ , wPφ )
space, and compare it to that of the (ICφ). The former is given by − (1−λ)(1−pU )λ(1−pP )
while the latter is −1−φ
φ
. Hence, isoprofits are flatter than the (ICφ) if (1 − pP ) ≥
(1 − pU) φ1−φ 1−λλ which can be rearranged to obtain (12). If the latter holds, the
right-hand graph in Figure 1 shows that the optimal contract has (ICP,φ) binding
and induces eﬃcient eﬀort in optimistic productive workers.
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Appendix G. Proof of Result 5
The proof follows that for Result 4, but using the (IRδ) instead of the (ICφ) con-
straint. Notice that here I use a partial equilibrium argument. That is, I assume
that, given the optimal contract for the pessimistic worker, the contract designed
for the optimistic worker adjusts in equilibrium in order for the (ICφ) to bind.
Appendix H. Proof of Corollary 2
To prove the corollary, simply notice that in area A both (12) and (13) must fail
and that pP ≥ pU . From the proofs of Result 4 and Result 5 the conditions are
respectively equivalent to:
1− φ
φ
≤ (1− λ)
λ
(1− pU)
(1− pP ) and (63)
(1− δ)λ
(1− λ)δ ≥
pU
pP
. (64)
Start by noticing that 1−λ
λ
> 1−φ
φ
. When pP ≥ pU , 1−pU1−pP ≥ 1. Hence, (63) always
fails. For (64), notice that (1−δ)λ
(1−λ)δ > 1. Hence the condition always fails for
pU
pP
≤ 1.
This proves that area A always takes up the entire space above the 45 degree line
in Figure 3.
Appendix I. Proof of Result 6
Checking for (ePi − eUi ) > 0, it is easy to see that this is true for all contracts and
all types when the (ICP,δ) binds. As for the rest of the contracts, it is also easy to
check that the oﬀers for productive types are always incentive compatible when
they induce separation. As for those for the pessimistic type:
ePδ − eUδ ≥ 0 if and only if φ <
δ
1− E(p) (65)
which generates (14).
